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I. INTRODUCTION
I am deeply grateful to the American Society of International
Law—especially to its president, Lucinda Low—and to the
International Legal Studies Program at American University
Washington College of Law—in particular, to the Dean of the
College, Camille Nelson, and to its program director, David
Hunter—for their generous invitation to deliver the nineteenth
Annual Grotius Lecture. Grateful, but more than a little intimidated.
Nobel laureates and heads of state, eminent judges, and leading
diplomats have given this distinguished lecture, but never, I think, a
*

This lecture will also be published in the ASIL Proceedings, forthcoming 2017.
Lloyd C. Blankfein Professor of History, Harvard University; Affiliated Faculty,
Harvard Law School.
†
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humble historian. As Isaac Newton might have said were he in my
shoes, “[i]f I can see far, it is because I stand on the shoulders of
these giants.”1
The theme of this year’s Annual Meeting is “What International
Law Values.” I fear I am going to be rather perverse—but I hope not
ungracious—in addressing a subject, civil war, that international law
mostly did not value, at least until quite recently. As the early
nineteenth-century Swiss theorist of war Antoine Henri Jomini
admitted of civil conflicts, “[t]o want to give maxims for these sorts
of wars would be absurd.” They were, he explained, more destructive
and cruel than conventional wars of policy because they were more
irrational and more ideological.2 Such an attitude prevented the
extension of the original Geneva Convention of 1864 to civil wars.
One of the Convention’s drafters, the Swiss jurist Gustave Moynier,
noted dismissively in 1870, “it goes without saying international
laws are not applicable to them.”3 As we shall see, it would be
another eighty years, in the wake of World War II, before
international law would “value” civil war, in the sense of taking it
seriously enough to attempt to regulate it. Not for nothing did Michel
Foucault once write of “the most disparaged of all wars: not Hobbes,
not Clausewitz, not the class struggle—[but] civil war (guerre
civile).”4
Civil war has long been a Cinderella subject, and not just for
international law: there is no great treatise On Civil War to stand
alongside Clausewitz’s On War or Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution,
1. Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (on file with
the Historical Society of Pennsylvania) (“[I]f I have seen further, it is by standing
on the shoulders of giants.”).
2. 2 ANTOINE HENRI JOMINI, PRÉCIS DE L’ART DE L’A GUERRE, OU NOUVEAU
TRAITÉ ANALYTIQUE DES PRINCIPALES COMBINAISONS DE LA STRATÉGIE, DE LA
GRANDE TACTIQUE ET DE LA POLITIQUE MILITAIRE 31 (1840) (“Vouloir donner des
maximes pour ces sortes de guerres serait absurd.”).
3. GUSTAVE MOYNIER, ÉTUDE SUR LA CONVENTION DE GENÈVE POUR
L’AMÉLIORATION D’U SORT DES MILITAIRES BLESSÉS DANS LES ARMÉES EN
CAMPAGNE [STUDY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
ARMED FORCES] 304 (1870) (“Nous ne parlons pas, cela va sans dire, des guerres
civiles; les lois internationales ne leur sont pas applicables.”).
4. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Chronologie, in 1 DITS ET ÉCRITS 1954–1988 13, 42
(1994) (“[L]a plus décriée des guerres: ni Hobbes, ni Clausewitz, ni lutte des
classes, la guerre civile.”).
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for instance. None of the great modern theorists of war, from Niccolò
Machiavelli to Mao Zedong, addressed it systematically or at any
appreciable length. Civil war barely registered in the era of what
David Kennedy notoriously called “primitive” legal scholarship
before the presiding genius of this lecture, Hugo Grotius, wrote.5 It
was also largely absent from the classic law of nations. Grotius
himself was somewhat baffled and ambivalent on the topic and it
was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that civil war
became an object of attention for international lawyers and students
of the laws of war. It still faced stiff resistance, and even what we
might call repression, from legal consciousness.6 Only in the late
twentieth century did international lawyers come to “value” civil
war, if by that we mean to pay it sustained attention, to expand their
horizons to encompass it, and to accord law normative force over its
conduct.

II. CIVIL WAR AND THE PROBLEM OF TIME
My story, then, will concern a subject international law devalued
and then reevaluated across the four centuries since Grotius himself
wrote in the early seventeenth century. I have tried to relate the
history of civil war at greater length in my most recent book, Civil
Wars: A History in Ideas (2017). There, I treat debates over the
meaning and application of civil war from ancient Rome to the
present—from Sulla to Syria, if you will.7 To give more focus to
what could be a much longer and more winding analytical argument,
I concentrate here on what I have called “civil war time.”8 My title
alludes to one of the pivotal books that inspired the ongoing dialogue
between international history and legal history in recent years, Mary
Dudziak’s germinal War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its
5. David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3-5
(1987).
6. See DAVID ARMITAGE, CIVIL WARS: A HISTORY IN IDEAS (2017), on which
this lecture draws heavily.
7. See generally ARMITAGE, supra note 6.
8. But cf. CHERYL A. WELLS, CIVIL WAR TIME: TEMPORALITY AND IDENTITY
IN AMERICA 1861–1865 1-10 (2005) (considering the conception of “civil war
time” as it applies to the American understanding of time during and after the U.S.
Civil War).
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Consequences (2012).9 My argument about the civil war time—about
the expansiveness, the elasticity, and the seeming interminability of
civil war—owes a great deal to the inspiration afforded by Dudziak’s
work on law and temporality. It is accordingly a special honor, as
well as a great pleasure, to have Professor Dudziak as the
distinguished discussant for my Grotius Lecture.
The standard view of the relationship between war and time is
deceptively straightforward, as Dudziak has reminded us. There is a
normal condition that we call peace, or the absence of war. A war is
declared, marking the start of that exceptional condition we call “war
time,” that “tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell, is
sufficiently known . . . All other time is PEACE,” as Thomas Hobbes
famously put it in his Leviathan (1651).10 Because war is directed
toward an end—victory, a treaty, the resumption of peace—we can
assume that war time will be finite. Dudziak has put this more
crisply:
We tend to believe that there are two kinds of time, wartime and
peacetime, and history consists in moving from one kind of time to the
next. Built into the very essence of our idea of war-time is the assumption
that war is temporary. The beginning of a war is the opening of an era that
will, by definition, come to an end.11

Dudziak dedicated her book to undoing that illusion, by showing
just how difficult it has been to determine when wars—especially the
United States’ modern wars, like World War II, the Cold War, and
the Global War on Terror—actually did end or, in the case of the
War on Terror, whether it would end or indeed ever could end.12
9. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS
CONSEQUENCES 3-9 (2012) [hereinafter DUDZIAK, WAR TIME] (discussing the
conception of war time and its consequences as temporary); see also Mary L.
Dudziak, War and Peace in Time and Space, 13 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 381, 38197 (2014) [hereinafter Dudziak, War and Peace] (analyzing the impacts of war
time on legal thought); Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1669-701 (2010) [hereinafter Dudziak, History of Time]
(assessing the spatial components of war time in contemporary American life
where American military action is largely carried out in other nations).
10. 2 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 192 (Noel Malcolm ed., 2012).
11. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME, supra note 9, at 5.
12. See id. at 35-69, 100, 127-28 (explaining how World War II, the Cold War,
and the Global War on Terror demonstrate a coexistence between, or possible
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When war time ceases to be bounded it opens up the prospect of
endless war, a “forever war” with no sign of victory and no hope of
peace.13 As Hobbes might have said, the time of peace vanishes amid
a “known disposition” to fight that never seems to go away.
Civil war, not even the U.S. Civil War, was not among Dudziak’s
examples in War Time but I want to extend her analysis to include it.
Civil war—large-scale armed conflict among the members of a
single political community—is even more slippery than other forms
of war and it has more disturbing temporal implications than
international armed conflict. There are three potential reasons for the
peculiar challenges civil war presents in this regard. First, it has
rarely been clear when a civil war begins. Second, it has been equally
uncertain until recently just when a civil war ends. And, third,
because civil wars so often recur, the idea that they begin or end can
be quite contentious, even dangerously fallacious. Far from being an
outlier or anomaly, as most theorists of war and law have deemed it
to be, civil war exemplifies how to think about the relations among
law, war, and time. Because civil wars are never declared, they have
uncertain beginnings. Even when they are formally terminated—by
surrender, armistice, treaty, or simply crushing military victory—
they resonate in historical memory and keep conflict alive even after
swords have been sheathed.14 And because they reerupt so often, it is
never clear that the conclusion of a civil war means it will in fact
end.
How international law treats civil war can be a particularly
revealing index of what it values, especially when beginnings and
endings, civil peace and civil war time, have been at stake. For ours
is now a world of civil war. After 1989, civil war gradually became
the most widespread, the most destructive, and most characteristic
form of organized human violence.15 If the three hundred years
merging of, war time and peacetime).
13. I take the term “forever war” from DEXTER FILKINS, THE FOREVER WAR
(2008), and MARK DANNER, SPIRAL: TRAPPED IN THE FOREVER WAR (2016).
14. See David Armitage, Civil Wars, from Beginning . . . to End?, 120 AM.
HIST. REV. 1829, 1835-37 (2015) (examining the extensive and violent impact civil
war has in shaping regions and continuing conflict for generations).
15. See ARMITAGE, supra note 6, at 5 (“Since 1989, an average of twenty
intrastate wars have been in progress at any moment—about ten times the annual
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between 1648 and 1945 comprised an era of interstate war, then the
last sixty years appear to be an age of intrastate conflict. Indeed, the
most striking change in patterns of conflict in that period has been
the shift from war between states to war within states. Since the end
of the Cold War, an average of twenty intrastate wars have been in
progress at any one time: that is, about ten times the annual average
for the decades between 1816 and 1989.16 The global estimate of
battle deaths in these wars since 1945 is roughly twenty-five million
people: that is, about half the estimated direct casualties in World
War II.17 Even that count does not include civilians, the wounded, or
those who died from the knock-on effects of war, such as disease,
malnutrition, and displacement. Civil war is no respecter of borders.
It turns countries inside out: think not just of the five hundred
thousand Syrians killed since 2011, but also the more than half of
that country’s population that civil war has uprooted internally and
externally.18 In the twenty-first century, almost all wars are now
“civil” wars. In 2016, the last year for which figures have been
calculated, there were only two interstate conflicts, between India
and Pakistan and Eritrea and Ethiopia, each over border disputes: the
latter lasted for only two days; all of the other fifty or so conflicts
around the globe, from Afghanistan to Yemen, were internal
conflicts.19 And these civil wars do not usually stay “civil” for long.
In 2016, eighteen of the world’s forty-seven internal conflicts were
“internationalized” civil wars: that is, conflicts that drew in forces
from neighboring countries or intervention from outside powers.20
average globally between 1816 and 1989.”).
16. ANN HIRONAKA, NEVERENDING WARS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
WEAK STATES, AND THE PERPETUATION OF CIVIL WAR 4 (2005).
17. HIRONAKA, supra note 16, at 2; see U.S. Dep’t of Def., World War II,
DEFENSE CASUALTY ANALYSIS SYSTEM (last visited Oct. 1, 2017), at
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties_ww2.xhtml.
18. See HIRONAKA, supra note 16, at 155; see also STERGIOS SKAPERDAS ET
AL., THE COSTS OF VIOLENCE 10 (World Bank 2009); WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (2011),
at https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011FullText.
pdf.
19. Marie Allansson, Erik Melander & Lotta Themnér, Organized Violence,
1989–2016, 54 J. PEACE RES. 574, 575-76 (2017).
20. Id. at 576; see also Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Transnational Dimensions of
Civil War, 44 J. PEACE RES. 293, 293-309 (2007); JEFFERY T. CHECKEL,
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Temporality is crucial to the horror of contemporary civil wars.
We now know that wars within states tend to last longer—some four
times longer—than wars between them.21 And that problem only
grew worse: in the second half of the twentieth century, civil wars
generally lasted three times longer than they did in the first half of
the century. Such conflicts are also much more prone to recur than
any others: “the most likely legacy of a civil war is further civil war.”
In fact, almost every civil war within the last decade was the
resumption of an earlier conflict.22 The interminability of civil
wars—the wounds they leave, the memories they scar, the specter of
recurrence they raise—is one of their most noticed features. “I
question whether any serious civil war ever does end,” T. S. Eliot
speculated in 1947.23 “All wars are bad,” agreed former French
President Charles de Gaulle on a trip to Spain in 1970, “because they
symbolize the breakdown of politics itself. But civil wars, in which
there are brothers in both trenches, are unforgivable, because peace is
not born when the war concludes.”24 The consequence was what one
Spanish historian more recently called “a long uncivil peace” (larga
paz incivil).25

TRANSNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF CIVIL WAR (2013).
21. See Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler & Måns Söderbom, On the Duration of
Civil War, 41 J. PEACE RES. 253, 253 (2004).
22. Se, e.g., PAUL COLLIER, WARS, GUNS, AND VOTES: DEMOCRACY IN
DANGEROUS PLACES 139 (2009) (quoted); see Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom,
supra note 21, at 257, 264; James D. Fearon, Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So
Much Longer Than Others?, 41 J. PEACE RES. 275, 276, 278-79 (2004); Barbara F.
Walter, Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War, 41 J.
PEACE RES. 371, 371 (2004); HIRONAKA, supra note 16, at 150; WORLD BANK,
supra note 18, at 57.
23. T. S. Eliot, Annual Lecture on a Master Mind: Milton, 33 PROC. BRIT.
ACAD. 61, 63 (1947).
24. Gregorio Marañon Moya, El general De Gaulle, en Toledo, EL PAÍS (Aug.
8, 1981), at https://elpais.com/diario/1981/08/08/opinion/366069615_850215.html
(translating “Todas las guerras son malas, porque simbolizan el fracaso de toda
política. Pero las guerras civiles, en las que en ambas trincheras hay hermanos, son
imperdonables, porque la paz no nace cuando la guerra termina.”).
25. JULIÁN CASANOVA ET AL., Presentación, in MORIR, MATAR, SOBREVIR: LA
VIOLENCIA EN LA DICTADURA DE FRANCO [DIE, KILL, SURVIVE: VIOLENCE IN
FRANCO’S DICTATORSHIP] ix, x (2004).
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III. CIVIL WAR TIME FROM ROME TO VATTEL
The open-endedness of civil war time is nothing new. The
recursive, apparently never-ending nature of civil wars was familiar
as far back as the Romans, who knew that civil wars came not singly
but in battalions. They left wounds that would not heal, heirs who
demanded vengeance, divisions that would split first the city of
Rome and then the entire Roman Empire of the Mediterranean and
beyond. They were wars without victories and brought only defeat;
as such, they were “wars which would bring no triumphs,” struggles
that did not end with the usual ceremonies for concluding formal
conflict.26 Among the repeated legacies of the Roman heritage were
two lessons about civil war time that would resonate down the
centuries: first, that it was rarely clear when civil wars actually
began, and, second, that it was abundantly clear that they might
never end.
Baffled as they were by the recurrence of their civil wars, the
Romans tried to work out just when (and why) they had begun and
dug back ever deeper into the ethical history of their commonwealth,
even as far back as the primal fratricide of Romulus and Remus, in
search of what the historian Tacitus called the “trial runs for civil
war.”27 They found so many antecedents, as well as so many
instances, that they likened civil wars to natural phenomena like
volcanoes that could fall dormant only to explode again without
warning. “These sufferings await, again to be endured,” laments a
character in the first-century poet Lucan’s account of the Civil War
between Caesar and Pompey: “this will be the sequence / of the
warfare, this will be the outcome fixed for civil strife.”28 In the terms
later laid down by Thomas Hobbes, for well over a century Rome
found itself in the midst of civil war time, in which the will to
contend by battle was sufficiently known to be repeatedly feared and
26. LUCAN, CIVIL WAR 3 (Susan H. Braund trans., 1992); see also CARL
SCHMITT, GLOSSARIUM: AUFZEICHNUNGEN DER JAHRE 1947–1951 42 (1991)
(translating “Im Bürgerkrieg gibt es keinen Triumph . . .”). But see CARSTEN
HJORT LANGE, TRIUMPHS IN THE AGE OF CIVIL WAR: THE LATE REPUBLIC AND
THE ADAPTABILITY OF TRIUMPHAL TRADITION 1-2, 7, 27, 95, 123 (2016).
27. See 1 TACITUS, THE HISTORIES 222-23 (Clifford H. Moore trans., 1925)
(illustrating the meaning of “ . . . temptamenta civilium bellorum”).
28. LUCAN, supra note 27, at 27.
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when peace would be no more than a vain hope or an illusion. In the
meantime, the Romans were condemned to “tread on fire /
smouldering under ashes,” as the poet Horace put it.29
At least until the nineteenth century, and the great historical
watershed marked by the U.S. Civil War, Western observers saw
civil wars in this Roman manner as cumulative historical
phenomena. Their sequential recurrence gave shape to the past, and
projected the likelihood of further internal conflict in the future. The
European inheritors of Rome’s traditions would see their own
internal troubles as the culmination, or repetition, of a cycle of
similar wars that followed the pattern of the Roman civil wars and
that had played out across Europe since the fall of the Roman
Empire.30 England alone had been through the Barons’ Wars of the
thirteenth century, the Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century and
then the civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century. Italy had had its
civil wars in the fifteenth century, followed by the French Wars of
Religion and the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish Monarchy in the
late sixteenth century, a conflict of which Grotius himself, in a
history of the revolt published posthumously in 1657, thought there
“wanteth [not] Reason why it may not be termed a Civil War.”31
Grotius was the first theorist of the law of nations—the early
modern discourse that preceded what came to be called international
law—to grapple with the meaning of civil war, though he did so only
briefly and inconclusively. He defined war generally as an “[a]rmed
execution against an armed adversary” and across his major works he
wrestled with the question of what kinds of war could be just.32 In his
earliest reflections on the subject in 1604, he distinguished between
public and private wars—public, which were executed by the public
will, or the legitimate authority in a state; private, if waged by other

29. HORACE, THE COMPLETE ODES AND EPODES 56 (David West trans., 1997).
30. See Paul Seaward, Clarendon, Tacitism, and the Civil Wars of Europe, in
THE USES OF HISTORY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 285, 297-98 (Paulina Kewes
ed., 2006) (illustrating examples such as the civil wars of the Low Countries).
31. HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 50
(Martine Julia van Ittersum ed., 2006) [hereinafter GROTIUS, PRIZE AND BOOTY].
32. Id. (claiming “just” wars consist of execution of a right while “unjust” wars
consist of execution of an injury).
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than that public will.33 Only once he had established that distinction
did he go on to describe civil war as that kind of public war waged
“against a part of the same state.”34
When Grotius returned to the question of civil war in his juridical
masterpiece, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), he added the category of
“mixed war” to his typology—that is, a war fought on one side by
the legitimate authority, on the other by “mere private Persons.”35
Yet he firmly opposed private war even against a usurper at the cost
of engaging a “Country in dangerous Troubles and bloody Wars” and
quoted Roman sources in support of his position: “A Civil War is
worse than the necessity of submitting to an unlawful
Government. . . .Any Peace is preferable to a Civil War.”36
Conservative arguments like this later earned Grotius the contempt
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who saw him as little more than a
defender of tyranny and slavery.37
It can hardly be said that Grotius took civil war very seriously, or
that he tried to explain it rigorously within the context of his broader
conceptions of war and peace. In this reluctance to value civil war,
he was typical of more than a century of reflection within the
tradition of the law of nations. Indeed, it would not be until the
middle of the eighteenth century that any thinker within that tradition
would take civil war seriously. It is only in the 1750s that we find a
turning point in considerations of civil war and of the
transformations—from war to peace, from criminality to
belligerency, from domestic peacetime to civil war time—in the
work of the now mostly forgotten Swiss jurist, Emer de Vattel.38
Vattel would set the terms of debate on civil war, and civil war time,
for at least a century after the publication of his work. His book
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 240 (Richard Tuck ed.,
2005) [hereinafter GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR].
36. GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 35, at 381, quoting Plutarch’s Life of
Brutus and Cicero’s Second Philippic.
37. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 42, 42-46 (Victor Gourevitch ed., 1997).
38. WALTER RECH, ENEMIES OF MANKIND: VATTEL’S THEORY OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY 207-09, 212-19 (2013).
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would be an invaluable vade mecum during later revolutionary
moments, from the meetings of the Continental Congress to draft the
U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1776, through the Latin
American and Greek independence movements, as well as the most
globally influential handbook of the law of nations well into the
nineteenth century.39
Vattel drew the lines among different species of war quite
differently from Grotius, to whom he nonetheless acknowledged
major debts in his hugely influential compendium of the law of
nations, the Droit des Gens (1758). Vattel disagreed with Grotius
that there could be any such thing as a private war and he confined
the exercise of war to states alone.40 This was, in his definition,
“[p]ublic war . . . which takes place between nations or sovereigns
and which is carried on in the name of the public power, and by its
order.”41 On the face of it, Vattel’s definition of war would seem to
exclude any chance that rebels against a sovereign or “public power”
could legitimately be recognized as belligerents rather than rebels.
His crucial innovation was to argue that they could. With that move,
he opened the way both to the application of the laws of war to civil
conflicts and to a radically new conception of civil war—and of civil
war time.
Vattel argued in terms drawn from John Locke that, “Every citizen
should . . . patiently endure evils which are not insupportable” unless
they are denied justice, in which case resistance might be justified “if
the evils be intolerable, and the oppression great and manifest.”42 But
what if the sovereign’s demands become intolerable and their own
people rise up in arms against them? Then, Vattel stated in a
groundbreaking definition, we have a case of civil war: “When a
party is formed in a state, who no longer obey the sovereign, and are
possessed of sufficient strength to oppose or when, in a republic, the
39. See DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL
HISTORY 40-41 (2007); ELISABETTA FIOCCHI MALASPINA, L’ETERNO RITORNO DEL
DROIT DES GENS DI EMER DE VATTEL (SECC. XVIII– XIX): L’IMPATTO SULLA
CULTURA GIURIDICA IN PROSPETTIVA GLOBALE (2017).
40. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 469 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008) (1758).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 642.
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nation is divided into two opposite factions, and both sides take up
arms, this is called civil war.”43 This could be distinguished from a
rebellion by the fact the insurgents have justice on their side: if the
cause of opposition is just, then the sovereign (or divided authority in
a republic) must wage war against the opposition: “[c]ustom
appropriates the term of ‘civil war’ to every war between the
members of one and the same political society.”44
Vattel’s conception of civil war time marked the ontological shift
that took place when the relations between ruler and ruled were
transformed into tyranny and oppression and thus into legitimate
resistance and a case of just war. The precise moment of passage
from one state to another might be impossible to pinpoint: certainly,
it would not be revealed by any formal declaration of hostilities from
one side or the other. The presence of civil war would be
recognizable in retrospect but only from that later vantage point:
Vattel knew, as did others in the natural law tradition, that there was
no clear threshold, no signal or symbol, that heralded the beginning
of civil war time, whether with a formal declaration or manifesto as
in contemporary interstate conflict. 45
Nonetheless, Vattel continued, the sides in a civil war may
recognize each other as parts of “the same political society” at the
point they have splintered into separate and hostile factions, as “it
produces in the nation two independent parties, who consider each
other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge,” and who
become “two separate bodies, two distinct societies.”46 It followed
that, if the two independent bodies were equivalent to two nations,
the law of nations should regulate their contentions. Sovereigns
should, therefore, treat their rebellious subjects according to the law
of war if they have just cause and have raised arms. By this point, the
unitary nation or state has already ceased to exist. The conflict has
become “a public war between two nations.” It no longer fell under
internal domestic law: civil war time had begun, even if the precise

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 644.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 500-08, on declarations of war in interstate conflict.
VATTEL, supra note 40, at 645.
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moment of the transition remained elusive.47

IV. THE U.S. CIVIL WAR AND THE
PROBLEM OF TIME
I turn now to perhaps the most important debate over civil war—
and civil war time—before the late twentieth century, during the
conflict we now know as the U.S. Civil War of 1861–65, in which
Vattel played a posthumous role. Within a few weeks of the
bombardment of Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, all sides—Northern
and Southern, American and foreign—had recognized the existence
of a war within the borders of the United States.48 The question of
just what kind of conflict this was, and hence what rules should
apply to its conduct, remained controversial. In the eyes of
supporters of the Confederacy, President Lincoln had already
prejudged the issue when in April 1861 he ordered ports from
Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande to be blockaded on
the grounds that the states of the Confederacy had raised “an
insurrection against the Government of the United States.”49 This
meant, among other things, that Union forces could capture neutral
ships attempting to supply the Confederate states on the grounds that
they were illegally supplying an enemy in a time of war.50 In
February 1863, the Supreme Court heard the four cases collectively
known as the Prize Cases, appealed from courts in Boston, New
York, and Key West, that questioned his decision.51
The plaintiffs argued that the blockade, and the subsequent use of
prize law to distribute the proceeds from four captured ships, applied
the laws of war to a situation in which no war had been declared, and
47. Id.
48. Quincy

Wright, The American Civil War (1861-65), in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 30, 42-43 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971).
49. Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, Proclamation of a Blockade (Apr. 19,
1861), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 338, 338 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1953).
50. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF
THE CIVIL WAR 32-34 (2010).
51. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 636-39 (1862) (discussing the four captured
vessels and the district court’s condemnation that the individuals on board were
either unaware of the war or unaware of the blockade).
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hence such laws could not operate. The main question before the
Court was, therefore, whether there was indeed a state of war that
would justify the president’s deployment of the laws of war. Justice
Robert Grier, writing for the majority in March 1863, was persuaded
by the government’s lawyers that there was indeed a war in
progress.52 The absence of a declaration of war prevented the
government from treating its adversaries as belligerents:
a civil war always begins by insurrection against the lawful authority of
the Government. A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such
by its accidents—the number, power, and organization of the persons who
originate and carry it on.53

The president was therefore bound to face this conflict “in the
shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it
with a name,” Grier declared, giving one of the clearest statements
up to that point of the sheer difficulty—indeed, near impossibility—
of stating when a civil war, let alone the Civil War, had been
initiated when it could never be “solemnly declared.”54 Behind
Grier’s judgment lay Vattel’s epoch-making definition of civil war.
Vattel had offered a factual account in The Law of Nations of when a
civil war had broken out, and when all sides could recognize that two
warring nations had emerged within the same territory. The existence
of a war would be clear to all: by the “number, power, and
organization” of those who prosecuted it.55 The applicable rules were
those of the law of nations, including the laws of war.56
The question in 1861 and later was whether a rebellion or a civil
war was taking place within the territory of the United States, and
when exactly (if at all) there had been a shift from one state to the
52. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666-71 (considering the various factors that indicate
when a war exists and declaring that “[t]he proclamation of blockade is itself
official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed”).
53. Id. at 666.
54. Id. at 666-69; BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 138-39 (2008);
NEFF, supra note 50, at 25-26; Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of
the Prize Cases: Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 73-76 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A.
Bradley eds., 2009).
55. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666.
56. Id. at 667-73.
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other, from domestic jurisdiction in peacetime to the sphere of the
law of nations in civil war time. This collision of perspectives was a
problem not only for politicians but even more acutely for military
commanders, especially on the Union side. Under what rules of
engagement would the Union Army treat the rebels? Did the laws of
war apply, and would bringing them to bear imply that the conflict
was, indeed, one between the forces of separate states? And why
might it matter if this was not an international war but a civil war?
Another of Lincoln’s advisors, the Maryland antisecessionist and
pamphleteer, Anna Ella Carroll (1815–94), answered such questions
defiantly in 1861 also with support from Vattel:
[T]his is a civil war; and, therefore, the Government may employ all the
Constitutional powers at its command for the subjugation of the
insurrectionary forces in the field. But while it is enabled to employ all
the powers, it is obliged to observe, at the same time, all the established
usages of war. For the same enlightened maxims of prudence and
humanity are as obviously applicable to a civil war as to any other.57

It was on this basis that the first codification of the laws of land
war was undertaken during the conflict by the Prussian-American
lawyer, Francis Lieber. At the heart of Lieber’s thought was a deep
ambivalence during the conflict about whether or not to think of civil
war as war at all. He believed a civil war could have the features of
both a “true war” and a domestic police action against insurrection,
but not every insurgent could be punished as if they were regular
criminals: “It is a question of expediency, and not of law or
morality.”58 How to overcome the double nature of civil war
presented a dilemma Lieber could not then resolve and this
uncertainty would bedevil his later attempts to define the boundary
between civil war and rebellion in the Lieber Code.59
When in 1863 Lieber came to define civil war in the body of his
57. ANNA ELLA CARROLL, THE WAR POWERS OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT
7 (1861).
58. FRANCIS LIEBER, LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR (1861-62), Lieber MSS, The
John Hopkins University, Box 2, item 17.
59. Paul Finkelman, Francis Lieber and the Modern Law of War, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2071, 2093-95 (2013); see JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS
OF WAR IN AMERICAN H ISTORY 181-211 (2012).
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Code, he still could not distinguish between the two forms of internal
violence. “Civil war,” the Code stated,
is war between two or more portions of a country or state, each
contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the
legitimate government. The term is also sometimes applied to war of
rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the state are
contiguous to those containing the seat of government.60

Rebellion, however, was “applied to an insurrection of large
extent, and is usually a war between the legitimate government of a
country and portions or provinces of the same who seek to throw off
their allegiance to it, and set up a government of their own.”61
By Lieber’s second definition, the U.S. Civil War was not a civil
war at all: it was in fact a rebellion. This accorded with the wording
of the Constitution, which provided for the means to “suppress
Insurrections” and permitted the suspension of habeas corpus “in
Cases of Rebellion,” as Lincoln had done, with Lieber’s advice and
support, in 1861.62 Lincoln himself referred to the conflict as a
“rebellion” six times more often than he called it a “civil war,”
making a mockery of Lieber’s anxious efforts at precision in
distinguishing civil war from rebellion and insurrection.63 But the
conflict did not come to an end with the surrender at Appomattox on
Palm Sunday, April 9, 1865. By some accounts the war was not
concluded until 1870, as Republicans declared that “wartime
continued” through Reconstruction.64 The ongoing contentions over
the Confederate battle flag suggest that the embers of that civil war
time may not yet be over: as the Vietnamese author Viet Thanh
Nguyen has recently written, “All wars are fought twice, the first
time on the battlefield, the second time in memory.”65 “And yet all
60. U.S. WAR DEP’T, ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFFICE, GENERAL ORDER NO.
100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, IN
THE FIELD art. 150 (1863) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE].
61. LIEBER CODE, art. 151.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9.
63. See Lincoln, supra note 50, at 425-63.
64. See GREGORY DOWNS, AFTER APPOMATTOX: MILITARY OCCUPATION AND
THE ENDS OF WAR 213-36 (2015); see also ELIZABETH R. VARON, APPOMATTOX:
VICTORY, DEFEAT, AND FREEDOM AT THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR (2014).
65. VIET THANH NGUYEN, NOTHING EVER DIES: VIETNAM AND THE MEMORY
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wars,” he continues, “have murky beginning and inconclusive
endings, oftentimes continuing a preceding war and foreshadowing a
later one.”66 That is especially true, I believe, of civil wars.

V. CIVIL WAR TIME SINCE 1949
Although the Lieber Code proved to be germinal for the later
Hague and Geneva Conventions, in 1863 it represented an outlier as
both international lawyers and students of war adamantly devalued
civil war throughout the nineteenth century.67 They would not
reevaluate civil war for another eighty years, in the aftermath of
World War II with the revision of the Geneva Conventions in 1949.
The most pressing issue on the minds of many delegates at the
Diplomatic Conference was how to extend the protections
guaranteed to recognized combatants in conventional international
warfare to “the victims of conflicts not of an international
character.”68 The result of their deliberations was Common Article 3,
which finally applied to what was then precisely termed “armed
conflict not of an international character” (later compressed to “noninternational armed conflict” or, even more succinctly, “NIAC”).69
It was not until 1977 that Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions expanded the range of protections and prohibitions
relevant to civil wars, and it remains in force today as the major
component of humanitarian law relevant to such struggles.70 The
application of those protections depends on the judgment that a
conflict “‘not of an international character” is in progress. If the
OF WAR 4

(2016).
66. Id. at 5.
67. Dapo Akande & Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Lieber Code and the
Regulation of Civil War in International Law, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 638,
639-40 (2015) (asserting that states viewed civil war as solely an internal, domestic
matter that was not to be considered in the instructions of the Lieber Code).
68. ARMITAGE, supra note 6, at 201.
69. See II.B DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF WAR, FINAL
RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 11-12 (1949); see
also SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 62-65 (2012).
70. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 89-132
(2002); see also SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 70, at 54-58.
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conflict is held to be “international”—that is, between two
independent sovereign communities—then the full force of the
Geneva Conventions applies.71 If it is “non-international” then it will
be covered by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.72 But if
the violence has not been deemed a conflict of either kind—perhaps
because it is a riot or an insurgency—it remains within the scope of
the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned and hence subject to
police action.73 In these cases, a great deal hangs on the
determination of whether or not a conflict is “not of an international
character” and whether or not a community has entered civil war
time.
To see why this determination of the passage from insurgency or
rebellion to civil war might matter, let us recall the case of Syria in
2011–12. Ordinary Syrians knew very well throughout 2011 and the
first half of 2012 that what they were experiencing amid contention
with the regime of Bashar al-Assad was civil war. Outside Syria,
interested parties across the globe debated whether or not Syria has
descended into civil war. The Syrian regime saw only rebellion. The
opposition said they were engaged in resistance. Global powers like
Russia and the United States held the threat of civil war over each
other’s head as they jousted over intervention and nonintervention.74
It took the International Committee of the Red Cross until July
2012—more than a year into the conflict, and after as many as
seventeen thousand people may have already perished—to confirm
that what was taking place in Syria was, in fact, an “armed conflict
71. ARMITAGE, supra note 6, at 205.
72. ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 109-12 (2010); Eric David,
Internal (Non-International) Armed Conflict, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 353, 362 (Andrew Clapham & Paola
Gaeta eds., 2014).
73. See DAVID ARMITAGE, Three Narratives of Civil War: Recurrence,
Remembrance and Reform from Sulla to Syria, in CIVIL WAR AND NARRATIVE:
TESTIMONY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, MEMOIR (Karine Deslandes, Fabrice Mourlon &
Bruno Tribout eds., 2017).
74. See Erica Chenoweth, The Syrian Conflict is Already a Civil War, AM.
PROSPECT (Jan. 15, 2012), at http://prospect.org/article/syrian-conflict-alreadycivil-war; see also Dan Murphy, Why It’s Time to Call Syria a Civil War,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jun. 5, 2012), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Backchannels/2012/0605/Why-it-s-time-to-call-Syria-a-civil-war.
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not of an international character.”75 Only when it had made that
determination would it be possible for the relevant parties to be
covered by the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions.76 The
reluctance to call the conflict a civil war has become typical of
international organizations in the twenty-first century because so
much—politically, militarily, legally, and ethically—now hangs on
the use or withholding of the term. A set of legal protocols designed
to humanize the conduct of civil war—to bring to bear humanitarian
constraints on its practice, and to minimize some of the terrible
human cost of civil conflict—served only to constrain international
actors in their attitudes toward Syria.
Expanding regulation of noninternational armed conflict by
international humanitarian law has had the perverse effect of making
it harder for international organizations to apply that body of law,
even as rebels and insurgents have tried increasingly to conform their
combat to its constraints. In the decades since World War II,
interstate wars have vanished almost to invisibility in part because of
the reluctance of states to call their wars “wars” and to give them
definite beginnings and endings with the traditional ceremonies of
declaring war and concluding peace treaties.77 One reason for the
elasticity of international conflict is precisely this lack of identifiable
markers for its inception and conclusion, as Dudziak has argued in
her book.78
Noninternational armed conflicts are just as indefinite in their
origins, but one paradox of the increasing penetration of international
75. Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in Syria, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 353, 374
(2016); Syria in Civil War, Red Cross Says, BBC NEWS: MIDDLE EAST (July 15,
2012), at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18849362.
76. See Interview by International Committee of the Red Cross with Kathleen
Lawand, Head, ICRC Unit on Law in Armed Conflict: Internal Conflicts or Other
Situations of Violence—What Is the Difference for Victims? (Dec. 12, 2012), at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-noninternational-armed-conflict.htm.
77. See Tanisha M. Fazal, The Demise of Peace Treaties in Interstate War, 67
INT’L ORG. 695, 695-724 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000246; see
also Tanisha M. Fazal, Why States No Longer Declare War, 21 SECURITY STUD.
557, 557-93 (2012), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
09636412.2012.734227.
78. See DUDZIAK, WAR TIME, supra note 9, at 26-27.
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humanitarian law into such conflicts has been a marked increase in
the number of them that have been terminated by treaties: in recent
years, more than 40 percent of civil wars have been concluded with a
treaty (compared to none in the immediate aftermath of World War
II). Counterintuitively, then, civil war time is becoming more clearly
defined, at least in the ending of conflicts like the Colombian Civil
War, even as interstate warfare has become more expansive and
open-ended in both directions.79
And yet, even as civil wars are increasingly coming to have more
determinate endings, their beginnings remain obscure. Civil war
time—that tract of time, as Hobbes might have said, wherein the will
to contend by battle is sufficiently known—can never be so readily
identified. There is often a battle of words before there is a struggle
with swords or their modern equivalents. As Hobbes noted in his
history of the English civil wars, when the English Parliament raised
an army in June 1642, “Hitherto (though it were a Warre before), yet
there was no bloodshed; they shot at one another with nothing but
paper.”80 There is never a formal signal for the passage from civil
peace to civil war: as Justice Grier remarked, “A civil war is never
solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents.”81 The
boundaries of civil war time have always been blurred in this
manner.
Contemporaries could only see in retrospect just when the “Warre
before” might be said to have begun, when the divisions had opened,
the sides formed, and the contentions that would lead to open
violence had their beginnings. With this in mind, we might be more
vigilant about the deepening partisanship in our own politics, the
seemingly unbridgeable gap of civility and comprehension between
opposing sides, and the violent language used by some of our
politicians. We might also pay more attention to the metaphorical
language of civil war that seems increasingly prevalent to describe
political differences within and between political parties, in the
79. TANISHA M. FAZAL, WARS OF LAW: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN THE
REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICT (2018).
80. THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH OR THE LONG PARLIAMENT 251-52 (Paul
Seaward ed., 2010).
81. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666.
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United States as across Europe and Latin America. When politics
becomes civil war by other means, we may already have entered civil
war time. Ours is therefore a particularly urgent moment to focus on
just what we value—what we share in common, what binds us
together, what fundamental principles underpin our disagreements—
both nationally and internationally.

